The Dual Meaning of Meaning :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

A central problem in the ism of language has been to find a way to reconcile first somebody pronouncement about meaning with out-of-doorist theories of meaning. In other words, if meanings arent wholly in the head (the externalist thesis), then how do we explain the apparent authority we absorb about what our own utterances mean? In this paper, I ordain front one possible and, I believe, highly plausible solution which will allow us to maintain that we do puzzle first somebody authority with regard to the meanings of our utterances while still accepting the lessons that Twin solid ground has taught us (that meanings are, at least in part, determined by the external humanness). Moreover, it is, I believe, a virtue of any philosophical system that it inhabit as close to common reek as analytical badness will allow. Thus, it is advisable that one try to approach philosophical questions as the layman still untainted by philosophy would approach them. This brand of com mon sense philosophy is what I shall attempt to use in providing an account of meaning. Let us begin, then, by examining first person authority. It seems quite obvious to me that, should there be no successful reconciliation of first person authority with externalism, the creator would defeat the latter in any theory of meaning. I do not say this just because it is highly counter-intuitive to think that we dont generally bop what we mean when we speak, rather it seems to me to be impossible to deny that we have this noesis not only do we go through what we mean, but we know that we know what we mean. Though most philosophers recognise the obviousness of this fact, some11 maintain that it is in take away of an explanation. This, I believe, is because they take externalism as more primitive than first person authority. What I mean is that these philosophers approach first person authority from the viewpoint of an already developed externalist theory. I suggest that, instead, we take the undeniability of first person authority as given and then attempt to provide a theory of meaning that preserves first person authority while accounting for the role of the external world in determining meaning. What exactly is it, then, of which we have this direct authoritative knowledge? And how, if at all, does it relate to the external world?